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If X is ? countable state space and g is a bounded reward function on X”, then say g has the 
Markov-adequacy property if every strategy has a corresponding randomized Markov strategy which 
gives g the same integral as the original strategy. A complete characterization of functions having the 
Markov-adequacy property is given. In particular, if g is permutation-invariant and X has at least three 
elements, then g has the Markov-adequacy property if and only if g has the linear sections property, a 
condition which is easy to verify. 
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1. Introduction 
A strategy (T begins with an initial probability measure on the subsets of a countable 
state space X. On the basis of that probability measure, a random state x, in X is 
obtained. Then a second probability measure depending on x1 causes a move to a 
new random state x2 in X. After this, depending on x, and x2, another probability 
measure is invoked, and the process continues. Finally, depending on previous states 
Xl,X2r**=,%I-l, the last probability measure causes a move to random state x,, in 
X. Then, for a given reward function g : X” + IR, the average value of g under this 
strategy (T can be computed. 
Next, a randomized Markov strategy 6 based on u can be defined. Such a strategy 
has the property that the probability measure 6 uses at xl, x2,. . . , -9cc; depends only 
on the most recent state xc; and on the time k. Further, this probability measure 
must be a weighted average, taken over the measures that (T prescribes, given the 
different possible length-k sequences of states xi, xi,. . . , xi, with XL = -yk. 
It is the purpose of this paper to give an exact characterization of those reward 
functions g such that every strategy 0 has a corresponding rando 
strategy 6 based on u for which the average value of g under (3 is t 
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average value of g under (T. We say that such functions have the ‘Markov-adequacy 
property’. 
It follows from Mrylov (1965) and Fainberg (1982bj timi rewarci functions of the 
‘total-reward’ type do have this property. (A more precise formulation is given later 
irl an example.) It follows from Hill and Pestien (‘1987) that non-negative ‘product- 
reward’ functions also have such a property. However, it is not dificult to construct 
examples of functions which fail to have this property, one of which is ‘maximum 
reward’ (see example below). 
In this study, we formulate an easily-verifiable condition, called the ‘linear sections 
property’, which turns out to be equivalent to the Markov adequacy property as 
long as the state space has at least three elements and g is permutation-invariant. 
2. Terminology, examples, and statements of main theorems 
Let X be a countable set and let n be a positive integer. Let X” be the Cartesian 
product of n copies of X. Instead of writing an element of X” in the form 
( ~1,~2,-*, x,), we will concatenate the components and write x1x2 l l l x,, . Also, if 
u E Xj and v E X”, where 1 <j + k c n, we write uv to represent hat element of Xj+k 
whose first through jth components are the j components of u and whose (j + 1)th 
through (j+ k)th components are the k components of u. 
A gamble is a probability measure on all subsets of X. An m-starge strategy, (where 
m is a positive integer) is a function from the set of sequences (of elements of X) 
with length less than m to the set of gambles. An m-stage strategy (T assigns a 
gamble ~(0) to the empty set and assigns a gamble a( x1 l l l xk ) to each xl l l l xk E X” 
such that 1 s k c m - 1. Any m-stage strategy (T induces a probability measure on 
X’“, and the average of a bounded function g : X m + !I2 with respect o this probability 
measure will be denoted by ~,Y~~I g do. Some of the terminology in this paper is 
borrowed from Dubins and Savage (1976). However, since a strategy in the Dubins- 
and-Savage sense assigns gambles to sequences of fortunes (states) of all finite 
lengths, the framework of (1976) is much more general than ours. By restricting 
ourselves to m-stage strategies and to a finite time horizon, we avoid any consider- 
ation of lin-ns Sver time. As a further restriction, we assume that all gambles are 
countably-additive. 
An m-stage strategy u is Markov if +r each k (1 c k < m), 
a(x,xf l e xii j = u(x’,xs. n *XL) 
whenever _JI~ = xi. That is, any gamble +,x3. - bxk) depends only on the most 
recent state xk and on the time k. 
Suppose lsk<m- 1. An m-stage strategy c is time-[ k, m) Markov if for each 
j such that k s j < m, 
d% * * * Xi) = o-(x; * l l xi) 
whenever xj = xi. 
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For 1 G k 6 M, define the kth projection mapping q : X” + X by 
If ib is an %r-stage strategy and p = p, - - - pk E Xk where I =i k c m, then [(a, p) 
denotes the probability under the strategy (7 that T, = p,, . . . , /rrk = pk. That is, 
6(n9P)= a(~)({P~})ga(P,)({p,})‘cr(p,p,)({p,})~ = l g(p,’ l -pk-1)({pk)). 
(2.1) 
For each m-stage strategy a, we define the collection RM, of randomized Markov 
strategies based on CT as follows: 6 E RM,, if and only if 6 is an m-stage Markov 
strategy satisfying G(0) =cr((d) and for each k (lsksm-1) and each XEX, the 
gamble that 6 prescribes at state x and time k is a mixture of gambles in the set 
M~=(o(px):p~X~-~’ and &_qpx)>O}; 
that is, for each k and each x, if Mt is non-empty, there exist real numbers cP where 
0 < cP G 1, where cP > 0 only if e(a, px) > 0, and where &ExA_, cP = 1, such that for 
each subset A of X and all 4 E XkDiV 
6( qx)(A) = c 
pCXA-' 
c,,o’I px)(A)- 
Notice that because of the c( a, px) > 0 condition wi?hin the set Mk, if two m-stage 
strategies CT and 6 induce the same measure on X’“, then the collections of measures 
induced on X” by the elements of RM(, and RM,-,, respectively, are the same. 
Markov strategies have been the subject of considerable previous work. In certain 
Markov decision models, dynamic programming models, and gambling models, 
conditions have been established which guarantee the existence of good randomized 
or non-randomized Markov strategies. For example, see Hill (1979), van Hee (1978), 
Fainberg (1982a, b), and Fainberg and Sonin (1983). Further, general sufficient 
conditions for the uniform adequacy of Markov policies were given by Schal and 
Sudderth (1987). Here, we start with a single given strategy rather than with a class 
of strategies arising from a decision model or gambling house. In many other 
situations, a Markov strategy is sought which is ‘good’ in the sense that its worth 
is nearly that of the supremum of the worths of all available strategies. In this 
study, we seek a strategy in RM, which has exactly the same worth as the given 
strategy U. 
We now begin the more formal portion of the section by definining a fundamental 
notion of the paper, the Markov adequacy property. 
efinition 2.1. Let n be a positive integer and g : X” + Iw be bounded. The function 
g has the rkov-adequacy property if for any n-stage strategy CK, there exists a 
strategy 6 in RM, such that 
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To prepare for a second fundamental notion, the linear sections property, we 
need some terminology: 
A subset S of I@ is strongly collinear if all points of S lie on the same 
straight line and that line either is horizontal, is vertical, or has positive slope. (Thus 
lines of negative slope are disallowed.) 
Let S be a subset of It*. ‘T;hen S satisfies one and only one of the following: 
(i) S is strongly collinear. 
(ii) S has a two-eletnent subset which is not strongly collinear. lhat is, there exist 
(a,,b,)ESand (a2,b2)ESsuch that 
bZ- b, - --CO. 
a*-@ 
(2.2) 
(iii) Every two-element subset of S is strong/y collinear but S has a three-element 
subset which is not strongly collinear. That is, relation (2.2) never holds, but there do 
exist three distinct points (a,, b,), (a*, b,), and (a,, b3) in S such that either a, # a3 
or a1 # a2 and such that 
b3-hfb2-bl -- 
9 
a3-al a2-a, 
(2.3) 
where both of the quotients in (2.3) are non-negative and where the result of any 
division by 0 is interpreted as +OQ 
roof. The lemma is immediate from the definition of strongly collinear and the 
geometric fact that if each three-element subset of S is strongly collinear, then S is 
strongly collinear. III 
Let k and n satisfy 2sksn- 1, let XEX, and let g:X”+R. The 
function g has the linear sections property at the node (x, k) if for each q E Xk-’ and 
each 4 E Xk-’ the set 
{(g(qxw), g(ixw)): w E XV-k) 
is strongly collinear. The function g .‘,&s the linear sections property if for each k 
(2<k<n- 1) and each x c X9 g has the lirmeqr sertions property at the node (x, k). 
The linear sections property is yuitz similar to the ‘related sections property’ 
formulated by Purves and Sudderth ilra their stud,y of optimal constant strategies for 
ling problems. We are grateful to Roger Purves and William Sudderth 
for giving us access to their u ublished notes (1982) on this subject. In these notes, 
etween their related sections 
property and a principle of L..?. Savage about utility functions (1972, Theorem 53.3). 
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A function g : X” + R is permutation-invariant if for each permutation 
(_&,.iz,=- . , j,,) of {1,2,. . I’) n}, we have 
g(x1 l l l xn)=g(x&xj./ l ax$. 
Here are the two main theorems of the paper: 
Theorem 2.6. Let n be a positive integer and let g : X” + R be a bounded function. If 
g has the linear sections property, then g has the Markov-adequacy property. 
Theorem 2.7. Suppose n is a positive integer, X has at least three elements, and 
g : X” + R is a bounded function which is permutation-invariant. If g has the Markov- 
adequacy property, then g has the linear sections property. 
We end the section by giving three elementary examples to illustrate the linear 
sections property. In all three, the functions g are permutation-invariant. 
Example 2.8 (total reward). Let u :X 44 be bounded (think of u as a ‘utility 
function’), and define g : X” + IR by 
dx, l ’ 'Xn)= i U(Xj). 
j= 1 
Then g has the linear sections property at each node (x, k). To see this, let q E Xk-*, 
qEX”-‘, and x E X and write 
{(g(qxw), g(qxw)): w E XnVk) = {(a + s,,, a^+ s,,): w E XnTk}, (2.5) 
where a = u(x)+Cjk_: u(qj), ii = u(x)+CTI: u(Lji), and s,,. =zyiF u(w,). Then all 
points which are members of the set in (2.5) lie on the same line, and that line has 
slope +l. 
Example 2.9 (maximum reward). Let X = { 1,2,3}, n = 3, and define g : X’ + R by 
Then 
ghx2x3) = madx, x2 9 x3). 
{MllYJ, my)): y E w = w,2), (2,2), (3,3)), 
and this set is not strongly collinear. Thus g does not have the linear sections property. 
Let X = (0, l}, n =4, and define g: X 4+lR by g(x,xzxJx4) = 1 if 
ww,x4 has at most one ‘l’, and g(x,x7x3x,) =0 if x,x2x3x4 has two or more ‘1’s. 
Let q=O, $=l, x-0. Then 
{(g(qxv), g(Gxu)): v E X2) = ((1, 0, (1, 0), (0,O)). 
The set is not strongly collinear, so g does not have the linear sections pr 
However, it is not difficult to verify directly that g does have the 
property. This example illustrates that the hypothesis 1x1~ 3 is essential in Theorem 
2.7. 
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3. The linear sections property and linear arkov-mixability 
We now define the notion of linearly-Markov-mixable function. In general, it is not 
as easy to check whether a function g is linearly-Markov-mixable as it is to check 
whether g has the linear sections property. However, we will see in Sections 4 and 
5 that the set of linearly-Markov-mixable functions is the same as the set of functions 
having the Markov-adequacy property. Thus to prove the main theorems of the 
previous section, it will be enough to show that under appropriate hypotheses, 
having the linear sections property is equivalent to being linearly-IvIarkov-mixable. 
Ifg:X”+Randp~X” where1 =G k < n, let g,, denote the function whose domain 
is X”-k and which is defined by gP( v) = g( pv) for u E Xnek. 
If er is an m-stage strategy and -p E X” where I s k < m, the conditional strategy 
CF given p is denoted by a[ p] and is the (m - k)-stage strategy defined by 
gIp](v) = 4 pv) 
for all v E X”-k-‘. Notice the 
the gamble a(p). 
difference in meaning betlrveen the strategy CT[ p] and 
efhition 3.1. Let k and n satisfy 2 s k c n -1 andletxEX.Thefunctiong:X”+R 
is lineurly-Markowmixable at the node (x, k) if and only if for each q E Xk-‘, each 
s^ E xk-‘, and each (n - k)-stage Markov strategy U, the set 
KJ gq.r** ddy I, X 11-h-I J X ,r_h_, t5j.v d4Yl : YE x > 1 
is strongly collinear. The function g is linearly-Markov-mixable if for each k (2 s k G 
n - 1) and each x E X, g is linearly-Markov-mixable at the node (x, k). 
3.2. Let k and n satisjj 2~ k s n - 1, let x E X, and suppose g : X” + IR is 
bounded. rf g has the linear sections property at the node (x, k), then g is lineaAy- 
Markov-mixabte tic ;he nude (x, k). 
roof. Fix q E XkV’ and GE Xk-’ and let u be an (n - k)-stage Markov strategy. 
By hypothesis, all points of the set (C$~IYW), g( Ljxw)): w E Xnmk} lie on the same 
straight line, and this line is horizontal, vertical, or has positive slope. Then for each 
y E X, the point 
oint is just an average of points on that line. Thus 
ounded guarantees 
that all integrals exist and are finite. 0 
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The converse of Theorem 3.2 is not true in general. However, a converse does 
hold under the extra assumptions that the space X has at least three points and 
that the function g is permutation-invariant. Since g being linearly-Markov-mixable 
is later seen to be equivalent to g having the Markov-adequacy property, the 
following theorem is fundamental: 
Theorem 3.3. Suppos~ 1x13 3. Let k and n satisfy 2 s k s n - 1, let x E X, and supposz 
the function g : X” + R! is bounded and permutation-invariant. If g is linearly Markov- 
mixable at the node (x, k), then g has the linear sections property at the node (x, k). 
The proof of Theorem 3,3 relies on a series of three lemmas which establish 
necessary conditions for g to be linearly-Markov-mixable. These lemmas are pre- 
ceded by two definitions which introduce some notation and terminology. 
Suppose throughout the remainder of the section that k and n satisfy 2 s k s n - 1, 
that the function g : X” 44 is bounded, permutation-invariant, that x is a fixed 
element of X, and that 9 and i are fixed elements of X’- ‘. 
Definition 3.4 Let u c X “-’ and v E X”? Write 
u x: v if and only if g(qxu) = g( qxv) and g(ixu) = g($xv) 
and write u x v if it is not the case that u v v. Write 
u<v if andonlyif g(qxu)<g(qxv) and g(txu)sg(ixv) and uX v. 
Write 
u w v if and only if 
g(&u) - gb.id < ()
g(qxu) -&Ix4 - 
(3.1) 
Finally, say u = u1 l 0 l u,,-k is disjoint from V = v, l l l vtl_k if we have Ui # Vi for 
each i (lsisn-k). 
efinitisn 3.5. Let u, v, and w be elements of X”-‘. Then u, v, w are non-aligned 
if u x w, v x w, u x v, and 
gm4 - g(qxw) # g(w) -g(qxM’) 
g@+gbjw g(&v)-g(ljxw)’ 
Also, u is aligned with v and w if v X w and 
g(q4 - g(qxw) g(qd - gbw? 
)-g(cixw)=g(~xv)-g(~xw) 
(allowing the possibility that u x v or u xw). 
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. Suppose there exist u E Xt’Ok and v E X’Iwk such that 
u w v. 
en g is not Hinearly- rkov-mixable at the Mode (x, k). 
e rearrange the components of u and v so that they differ up to a certain 
stage and agree from then onward. That is, we find nz such that 1 G m G n - k and 
a permutation (j,,..., j,+) of (l,...,n-k) SUCK that Uj,=vj, if i>m and Uji#Uji 
if iSm (H&n -k). Also, define ut = ul, l l l uL_, and vt = vi l l l I.(,_~~ so that 
u; = lljl and V: =Vj, (KiGn - k). Then by hypothesis, (3.1), and the permutation- 
invariance of g, 
ut w d. (3.2) 
(Since u and v are distinct, it follows from our construction of ut and up that ui # vl, .) 
Now we define the (n - k)-stage Markov strategy CT which will cause g not to be 
arkov-mixable. Specify the initial gamble ~($9) by 
~(a)({y}) = ~ 
ify= ‘1 other~iseor ’ 
. 
Let, lStSr;-k- 1. To specify the gambles for u at the tth stage, let p E XI-‘, let 
er( pu:) assign mass 1 to {u:,,}, let a( pv:} assign mass 1 to {vi,,}, and for y E X 
such that y F! {u: , vi}, arbitrarily let a( py) give mass 1 to {y}. Notice that (T is Markov 
and that the rearrangment of components helped us to define Q in a Markov way. 
From the definition of Q and from (3.2) we get 
Then 
mixable 
j gPXUi do["',l -j gq.Kc,i da[vl,l g(qxu’) -g(qxv’) < 0 
j gi.xtti ‘qLU’,l -J gG.rt>i Q~[V’ll= g(iXu’) -gC$Xv’) * 
Lemma 2.3 and Definition 3.1 imply that g is not linearly-Markov- 
cl 
J. Suppose 1x13 3 and that there exist elements u, v, and w in X”-” such 
that u, v, w are non aligned, and suppose that w is disjoint from both u and v. Then 
g is not linearly- arkov-mixable at the node (x, k). 
ma 3.6, we 16z1ange t e components of u a 
srnW+-k awl a per 
such that ui, = vi, if i > 
and v’= vi l ’ *Vk_k, SO Ui=Ui, and V:=e(i, (%isn--k). 
by hypothesis u, v, w are non-aligned, 
hus there is no “point of splitting’ where 
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‘randomization’ is necessary. I-Ience we can easily build the appropriate (~1 - Q-stage 
Markov startegy 67; which Oixs essentially on the three paths u’, v’, and w’. 
Start the construction by setting 
I 
a(~)({y}) = 6 
if yE{u;, ~1,~ wl,], 
otherwise 
. 
For lstsn--k-f and forPEX’-’ let U( pu:) assign mass I to {u:,,}, let a( pvi) 
assign mass B to (d+J, let a(pw:) assign mass 1 to {w:,,}, and for y E X such that 
y B { ui vi a MS:}, arbitrarily let a( pv) give mass 1 to {y}. Then 
and 
Because u’, v’, w’ are non-aligned, we get 
and conclude by Lemma 2.3 that g is not linearly Markov mixable at the node 
(x, k). 0 
1 amma 3 R Cunnose 1x1~ 3 and that there exist elements u, v, and w in A? such n4*....--- z,: ‘_ I * 
that u, v, w are non-alig;ed, 
and w is disjoint from v. Then g is not linearly-Markov-mixable at the node (x, k). 
roof. If additionally u is disjoint from v or w, then by Lemma 3.7 the proof is 
finished. So assume u has at least one component in common with each of v and w. 
Rearrange the components of u and v and w: find m and fi such that 0~ m s ti s 
n-kandapermutation(j,,..., jn_k)of(l,...,n-k)suchthat~j,=v,,ifm<i~ - 
and uj, # vj, if i ~mor~<i~n-kandsuchthatuj,=wj,ifi>~and~j,~~i,ifi~~. 
Define M’ = U; l - l u;_, , VI= v’, - l l ~:,._k, and WI= wl, 9 . . w:,_,, , SO U: = ui,v C: = Vj, 
and Wi = Wj, (1 S i S n - k). 
ecause g is permutation-invariant an U, v, w are non-iiligne , the rearrange 
el ents u’, u’, w’ are non-aligned. 
enne the element z’= zl, l . l z;_~ in *--I+ bY 
Let 2 = z1 l l l Z*_k satisfy zi, = z:. There are now four cases to consider: 
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&se (i): u, z, w are non-aligned. Here, the paths u’, z’, and w, are all different 
up to stage m, then ti’ and z’ agree between stages pn and fi, and finally all three 
agree after stage @I. As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, there is no stage at which any 
two of the three paths, having agreed up to that stage, then split apart. Thus again, 
no randomization is necessary, and we can build an (n - &stage Markov strategy 
G which lives essentially on the three paths u’, z’, and w’. Use the same construction 
as in the proof of Lemma 3.7, with v’ replaced by z’. 
Case (ii): z is aligned with w and u, and z < v. We rearrange the order of the 
components of u’, z’, and v’ by taking the interval i > fi first, the interval is m 
second, and the interval pn < i s fi third. That is, define u” so that 
if 16sn-k-rii, 
if n-k-ti<idn-k, 
and define zy and v:C analogously. 
In this situation the paths u” and z” agree up to stage n - k - ti and then split 
apart. After stage n - k - fi, the paths Z” and v” agree. (Beyond stage n - k + m - rii, 
all three paths agree.) Because of the splitting of paths u” and z”, a Markov strategy 
will require randomization at the point of splitting. Begin to specify the (II- k)-stage 
Markov strategy g by setting 
0(0)({zl}) = $ (notice z; = uy) and a(@({ vl}) = $. 
To specify the gamble at the point of splitting, for each p E X’l-k-‘h-‘, let (T( ~zZ-~_~) 
assignmassp to{u~_x:_m+,}andmass1-~to{~~_~_,i,+l}rwhere~satisfiesO~~~1. 
Then it is easy to finish the definition of the strategy G in such a way that G is 
Markov and so that the conditional strategy cp[uy] gives mass p to the singleton 
{ 
N u2. ’ l uE_J, so that o[zl] gives mass 1 -p to (24. l l z:-~}, and so that a[ vy] gives 
mass 1 to {v,“. l - vi_,}. Thus the Markov strategy (T lives on v” and on a mixture 
of u” and z”. 
By the hypotheses of the lemma, permutation invariance, and the extra hypothesis 
z < v of Case (ii), we have z”, v”, u” non-aligned and 
zi’ 4g 0” eg u”. 
Thus there must exrst some value of p (0 < p < 1) such that 
~g,\-,trd~~ulll-~gy\-qd~[v’(] Pa(4xu")+(l-~)g(qxz")-g(qxv")<o 
! gtiuty dd 4’1- ,r g+,?; 
=-- _-_ 
do[ v:] pg( ijxu”) i- (I- p)g((xz”) - g( ijxv") l 
We conclude bv Lemma 2.3 that g is not linearly Markov mixable at the node (x, k). 
Case (iii): z is aligned with w and u, ahd v < z. Since the proof is analogous to 
that of Case (ii), we omit some of the detailed notation. Re-order the components 
of u”, u’, and z’ by taking the interval i > fi first, the interval m c is fi second, 
ird. That is, define w”, I_+‘, and Z” to be w’, v’, and Z’ in 
s w” an to stage pa - k - tf~ and then 
split apart. After stage n - k - ti, the paths Z” and v” agree. 
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To define the desired strategy q notice that WY = zl; and let 
dO>({ 47) = $ and g(8)({ UT}) = f. 
Define the rest of a in such a way that (r is Markov and so the conditional strategy 
a[w;Y] gives mass p to the singleton (w: l l 0 w::_.~}, so a[ wl] gives mass 1 -p to 
c a;. l l zz__,} for some p between 0 and 1, and so a[ uy] gives mass 1 to {UT l 9 . v:-~]. 
Thus the Markov strategy ~7 lives on v” and on a mixture of w” and 2”. 
By the hypotheses of the lemma, permutation invariance, and the extra hypothesis 
u 4 z of Case (iii), we have w”, z”, u” non-aligned and 
wN e v” -e zff. 
Then as in Case (ii}, 
By Lemma 2.3, g is not linearly Markov mixable at the node (x, k). 
Case (iv): z is aligned with w and U, but z w u. Since z w v, the desired conclusion 
is immediate from Lemma 3.6. Cl 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Suppose g does not have the linear sections property at the 
node (x, k). Then there exist 4 E X”-’ and GE X”-’ such that the set (2.4) is not 
strongly collinear. In case there exist u and u in XI’-’ such that u w u, it is immediate 
from Lemma 3.6 that g is not linearly-Markov-mixable at (x, k). By Lemma 2.3 and 
Definition 2.4, if there are no paths u and v in X’lek such that u w o and if g does 
not have the linear sections property, then there must exist u, u, and M’ in X”-” 
such that 
and such that u, v, w are non-aligned. Assume for the rest of the proof that u, v, 
and w have such a relationship. 
Since 1x1~ 3, there exists ZE Xnek such that I is disjoint from u and v. Also, there 
exists IAE Xtrmk such that i is disjoint from u and w. (If we had IX1 2 4, then we 
could take I and r^ to be the same path, and the proof would be much easier. 
However, to allow for the case Ix~= 3, our general proof becomes more involved.) 
There is some overlap in the following cases, but it is easy to see that the list is 
exhaustive. 
Case (a). I, u, and u are non-aligned. Lemma 3.7 applies, since C is disjoint from 
u and V. Therefore g is not linearly-Markov-mixable at (x, k). 
Case (6). l u, and w are non-aligned. Lemma 3.7 applies, since iis disjoint from 
u and w. Again g is not linearly-Markov-mixable at (x, k). 
case cc). I is aligned with M and u and I x u. Then I is disjoint from v and 
erefore Lemma 3.8 applies, and g is not linearly-Markov-mixable at 
(x, 0 
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Case (6a). I is aligned with u and o and I x: 14 and I < w. Then I is disjoint from 
u, and either I < u < w or u < I < w. In both situations, Lemma 3.8 applies. 
Case (e]. I is aligned with u and u and i is aligned with u and w and I “%I u and 
ix: u. Then t4 is disjoint from I and f, and I, [ u are non-aligned. Thus Lemma 
3.7 applies. 
Case (f). d is aligned with u and v and r^ is aligned with u and w and I x u and 
i~ u and w 4 1. Then f< w < 2 and I is disjoint from w. It follows from Lemma 
3.8 that g is not linearly-Markov-mixable at (x, k). 
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is complete. 0 
sv-mixability is su arkov adequacy 
core .I. Suppose the function g : X * + R is bounded. If g is linearly r”vlarkov- 
mixable then g has the Markov-adequacy property. 
The proof of Theorem 4.1 depends on several technical lemmas and on the key 
idea of constructing a time-k Markov randomization of a strategy with respect to a 
set of weights. This idea will be introduced after the first three lemmas, which record 
some basic facts about finite-stage strategies and the linearly-Markov-mixable 
condition. 
ma 4.2. Suppose the junction g : X” + R is bounded and linearly-Markov-mixable. 
Then there exist mappings al : X”-” + [0, w), p, : XI’-’ -+ IR, and y1 : X”+ IR such that 
for each q E X1’-‘, each x E X, and each y E X, 
Further, for each k (2 s k s n - 2), and each (n - k)-stage Markov strategy cr, there 
exist mappings CY,,~ : X “A -j [0, OO), &k : X “A + IR, and yCT,k : X ‘+’ + R such that for 
each q E Xn-k-‘, each x E X, and each y E X, 
(4.2) 
roof. This lemma is a. translation of the notion of linearly-9larkov-mixable into 
slope-and-intercept language. 0 
.3. Let n and k be integers satisfying 2 < k s n - 1, and let g : X * -+ IIB be a 
bounded function such that for each q in k, the function gq is constant on X”-“. 
Suppose ep a o-* are n-stage strategies s 
k-l 
)=C*(p) forallp in U Xi. 
i=l 
(4.3 1 
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Proof. It follows from (4.3) that 
for all x E X and all q E X”-‘. Notice that since gqmV is a constant on XnWk, we must 
have 
So for each x E X, 
and 
I gdo= I g d~%P]. (q=s} ( ssl, .= x} 
Hence 
gdcr= gda*= gdc”. Cl 
Lemma 4.4. Let n and k be integers atisfying 1 s k s n - 2. If a is an n-stage strategy, 
q E xk-‘, x E X, y E X, and w E Xn-k-‘, then 
Proof. This lemma is merely a product rule for conditional probabilities, and it 
follows from (2.1). Cl 
Let k and n satisfy 2 5 k s n - 1, and let CT be an n-stage strategy. 
Let { vY: x E X} be a family of functions qy : X”-’ + [0, l] which satisfy 
for each x. Let 6 be the n-stage strategy defined by 
Then & is the time-k Markov randomization of c with weights { v.~: x E X}. 
(kx)X(xb)n = (IL&)~ 
4 %Il+ 
,+fXZ y 
au$aa ‘8 t zx : X. puv ‘(00 ‘01 t !.x : n Ia7 ‘2 - u 5; [s; 1. ~JQivs u pm [ia7 
l L
x OJ lenba awu!pJoof, yDz?a Zk+ey *_J JO auawala ayl sy x aJayM 
‘asyuay~o 0 
‘S=YJ! I 
I 
= ( y)“tc 
faspwmaylo 0 
‘,Y=YJ! I 
I 
= (y)“ll 
auyap put!,y yans au0 JDaias 
“S 
r(xy)n(xy ‘fq T” (y)% 
auyap ‘,_,x3y yea put2 ‘of? 3~~3 yens x asoy) ;rod 
l_vxw 
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Therefore, with the help of Definition 4.6 and Lemma 4.4, and with q* an arbitrary 
element of Xk-‘, we get 
I A do = sXG[q*xl, yh(xy) [7r,=x,n,+,=y] 
= c 5G, qxMaq~l, Y)dqx)Y(xy) 
t/E X'_' 
= I Ad& Cl [?r, =x, ST , +, = _I’ 1 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose g : X” + R is bounded and linearly Markov-mixable. 
Let (T be an n-stage strategy. We construct a sequence of n-stage strategies 
U’, C2,. . . , tT n-2, such that for each k, ok is the time-( n - k) randomization of ok-’ 
with weights to be defined below. These weights will be chosen in such a way that 
(4.4) 
By Lemma 4.2, there exist mappings cyI : X”-’ + [0, a), PI : X”-’ + R, and y1 : X2 + 
R such that for each q E Xne2, each x E X, and each y E X, (4.1) holds. Let 0’ be 
the time-@ - 1) Markov randomization of (T with the family of weight functions 
based on cu, and CF (see Definitions 4.5 and 4.6). IIf A, : X” + R is defined by 
for q E Xn-*, x E X, and y E X, then by Lemma 4.7, we have 
r 
J A, da’ = I hl da. x ” x ” 
Also define b, : X” + IF8 by 
i&bYJ = PdP) 
for all pEX”-’ and all y E X. Then by Lemma 4.3, 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
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Then by (4.1), the definitioer of Al and ii, and by (4.6) and (43, 
f 
gda’= J g dcr. ,I Y ” x ” 
or the induction step, suppose 2 6 k c n - 1 and that a strategy gk-l has been 
constructed which is time-[ n - k + 1, ra)-Markov. By Lemma 4.2, there exist mappings 
CYI,: : n-k -) [O, OO), Pk : Yek 42, and yk : X’+’ + R such that for each q E Xnek-‘, 
each x E X, and each y E X, 
~__, &.x_v dc+“-‘[-Yl= ak(qx) I ,~~_’ (Yk)xy dCT "-'kyl+Pk(qd, (4.8) 
where ’ -y’ denotes any element of Xndk+’ whose (n - k + 1)th coordinate is y. 
Let ak be the time+ - k) Markov randomization of ak-’ with the family of 
weight functions based on cyk and ak-’ (again see Definitions 4.5 and 4.6). Since 
(T~-‘[ py] and a”[ py] are the same strategy for all p E X”-‘+‘, we can also write 
(4.8) as 
I\_, &.x.\. duk[-yl - ak(qd ~_, (Ykc)sy da”[-.J’]+&(qX)- 
efine y~:X’+R by 
for XE and yE and define Al, 
&(qxy) = aktqx)y:(xy) 
for qE ‘i-k-‘9 xfs and YEX. 
(n - k + 1 )-stage strategies formed 
stages, then 
(4.10) 
Then by Lemma 4.7, if a”-’ and a*” are the 
by restricting &’ and ck to the first n-k+1 
AA de”-‘. (4.11) 
x ” ktl 
for all p E n-k and all YE 
.8) with respect to Oh-’ and integrate both sides of 
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(4.9) with respect to Cr”, then from (4.10), (4.11), and (4.B2), we get 
gdok= 
I ,,-&.+l hk dok + J ,& da” ,, X X 11-A tl 
e 
A 
;T J hk dek-‘+ I Pd -k-l 1 t7 X n-k+1 X u-h+1 
= g dc?. 
,I 
Thus by induction, (4.4) holds. If “we let 6 = 0”-‘, then the strategy 6 is 
and belongs to RM,,, and it follows from (4.4) that 
Thus g has the Markov-adequacy property. Cl 
ov-mixability is necessa uacy 
. Let ISlSjSn, q E Xi, v E X’. Then v is a subhistory of q if there 
exist non-negative integers I, and Zz and there exist u1 E X’I and u2 E A? such that 
I,+Z+I,=j and q=u,vu?. (If I, = 0 or Zz = 0, then u, or uz is taken to be the empty 
string.) 
Let j be a positive integer and A c X-‘. The historical closure of A is 
the set 
v,(A) X T,(A) X l . l X nj(A), 
where for each I (1 s Is j), 
r,(A) = {x: for some xl 0 l l xi E A, we have x1 =x}. 
Thus the historical closure of a subset A of Xi contains 
formed by piecing together portions of various histories in 
closure of A is just the set 
those elements of 
, and the historical 
i: for some n-2, t ere exist subhistories vl 9 s . . , u,,, of 
q = VI l l l v,,). 
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Proof. For each j (I <j G k), let Nj be the number of elements in nj(A). D&m kh 
as follows: Let 
bm({YH = 1lNl if Y (2 n(A) 
and for x1 l **XjEXj (16jGk-1) let 
Pbl l * ’ xj)({Yl) = 11 Nj+* for each YE rj+l(A)* 
Then p is Markov and for each p E C, 
Theorem 5.4. If n is a positive integer and the function g : A?’ + R has the Markov- 
adequacy property, then g is Ir’nearly Markov-mixable. 
Suppose by way of contradiction that the function g is not linearly Markov- 
mixable. Then there is an integer k (2 s k s n - 1) and an element x* in X such 
that g is not linearly Markov-mixable at (x*, k). Thus there exist q E Xk-‘, 4 E XkP1, 
and an (n - k)-stage Markov strategy p such that the set 
s;, = ((I &.x”.\. dP l.Y 19 X 11-L-l I X ,,_~_, gLjx*y dAYI : Y (5 x > I 
is not strongly collinear. So the set Sr.4 satisfies either condition (ii) or condition 
(iii) of Lemma 2.3, and we divide the argument into two parts. 
Part 1. Suppose SC.4 satisfies condition (iii) of Lemma 2.3. Then there exist 
elements yl, y2, and y3 in X such that if for each i (1 s i s 3), 
cli = I x ,,_l\_, gCJX*yi dPIYil and bi = I X ,,_~_, glj.X”?,i dP[Yi19 
then (a,, b,), ( a2, b2), and (a,, b3) are distinct points in SC,, and satisfy 
a1 _- sa+a, and b,sb,<b, (5.1) 
and 
b2-h f: a2-a, - - 
b-h q-a,’ (5.2) 
Let C’ be the historical closure of the set {q, i}. To simplify notation, for 1 s i s 3 
and for p E C let 
cy = 
Y 
,,_~ _, gpx*y, dPIYil- 
It tohh3 il”3i-n ition (iii) of Lemma 2.3 that 
(5.3) 
cys c,ps cg for each p E C. (5.4) 
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We now begin to define the strategy cp by specifying the first k stages. It is clear 
that the historical closure C of the two-element set {q, i} has only a finite number 
of elements. Call this number M. Because of Lemma 5.3, we can construct u so that 
((cr,p)= l/M for every PE C (5.5) 
and so that for each j (1 s j s k - 2), and each xl l 9 l xi E Xi the gamble a(x, l l l xi) 
depends only on xi and not on x1, x2,. . . , xi_]. Next, for each x1 l l l x&__~ E Xk-‘, 
let a(x, l l l x,+_*) give mass 1 to (x*1. Because of the way we have defined u so far, 
(T((Tk =x”)) = 1. (5.6) 
To describe (T for the next stage, we must define a( px), where p E Xkei and x E X. 
To do so, let 
&E&P - CY) 
S=~,cc(cf-C~)= 
Choose p* E C such that 
* P* cg -c, P cg-c, * 
P CT -c, 
.=min 7: peC and cp#cy 
+---cl 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
It follows from (5.2), (5.4) and the choice of y, , y2, and y, that the set on the 
right side of (5.8) is non-empty and that 
* P* c;‘-c, 
s> * r)* 2 0. 
c; -c; 
(5.9) 
Define a(p*x”) so that 
a( p*x*)({YJ) = s (5.10) 
and 
a( p*x*)({y,}) = 1 - s. 
If p E xk-* and p # p*, define a( px*) so that 
(5.11) 
4 Px*)({Y2H = 1. (5.12) 
If pEXk-’ and x # x*, define (rather arbitrarily) 
~(PMY2H = 1. 
(The latter definition is not critical, since with o-probability 1, the kth coordinate 
is x*.) 
Next, we must describe (T for the remaining n - k - 1 stages. We define (T in such 
a way that cp is time-[k + 1, n)- arkov and such that for each p E Xk-‘, and for 
each i (1 G i c 3), the conditional strategy a[ px*yi] is precisely the (n - k - I)-stage 
Markov strategy p[yi]. Thus we are able to construct u so that for 1 s i c 3, an 
for each w E Xr’-‘-‘, 
(5.13) 
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Therefore, with the help of (5.5 j, (5.6 j, and (5.13 j, we get 
gdQ-= Lx. c c sbcP~*I9 YMdP~*Yl, wbg(px*Ye~ 
pee ?‘E x ,*,< x”- A-l 
Then we use (5.3), (SJO), (5.11), and (5.12) to obtain 
gdg= z 
1 
pc c-,p#p* 
E ,,_~__; !%*x*_v3 4dY31 
1-S 
+Y- ,,,_~_, gp*.x*:y, &4Y*l -.- I,? 
1 
=xi c 
cg+Scl;*+(l --sj$ . 
pc C.p#p” I 
By rewriting this equality, we get 
c C;+s(cl;*-cr*)-(c~;“-c~*j . 
PEC I 
It is now a consequence of (5.9 j and (5.14) that 
1 
gdm>M 1 cc. 
PCC 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
Next, we contrast I g do with E g d& where 6 is a randomized Markov strategy 
based on (or. Notice that it is only when j = k and xk = x* that the gamble a(x,x, l l l xi) 
depends on x1x2 l - l xi_ , . Thus for any 6 in RM,,, we have 
if j # k or if xi # x*; also, there is a number p such that 0~ p s 1 and such that for 
all p E k-l 3 
3 Px*)({Yt)) = Ps, ~(px*)({y3)j=P(1-s) and ~(px*)({y&=1-P. 
It then follows 
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y using the definition of s (relation (5.7)), we finally obtain 
(5.16) 
After comparing (5.16) with (5X), we conclude that for every & in lr‘$ 
Thus g does not have the Markov-adequacy property. The proof of Part I is complete. 
&rb II. Suppose SC,, satisfies condition (ii) of Lemma 2.3. Then there exist 
elements y, E X and yz E X such that if for i = 1 and for i = 2, 
then 
b2 -= b, 
----CO. 
a2-& 
(5.17) 
The argument to show g does not have the lVIarkov adequacy property is quite 
similar to that in Part I. Let C be the historical closure of the set {q, @}, and for 
Wis2andforpEC let 
c; = 
I 
,,_~ _I gpx*.V, d/4Yil9 (5.18) 
X 
and let M be the number of elements in C. Because of Lemma 5.3, we can again 
construct (T so that 
t(~,p)= l/M for every PE C’ (5.19) 
and so that for each j (1 c j s k - I) and each xix:! l l l xi E X’, the gamble 
&IX2 l l l Xi) depends only on xi. Also, for each X, l l •xA-~ E Xk-‘, let a(~, 0 l *x,+-l) 
give mass I to {x*}. It follows that 
a((7Q =x#}) = 1. (5.20) 
Next, to define (T( px*), where p E Xkel, let 
a(Px*)({~l}) = 
i 
1 if c+cr, 
.. if c’)~ d’p 
1 - 29 
and 
(5.21) 
cT( PXMYZH = 1. 
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As before, we can define CF in such a way that CF is time-[k + 1, n)-Markov and 
such that for each p E Xkwt9 and for i = 1 and i = 2, the conditional strategy a[ px*yi] 
is precisely the (n - k - l)-stage ?Airkov strategy p[yJ. 
Then we use (5X9-(5.22) to obtak 
That is, 
1 
PI 
gdcr=G C 1 _ c; . CL)‘+ r (5.23) 
pr r:c:‘-cy I’ 1’ /‘C 4 : I j . “1 > 
Next, let GE RM,,. As in Part I, it is only when j = k and xk = x* that the gamble 
cT(X,X~ * - - +) depends on xlxz l - l Xj_l. Thus we have 
G(X,Xz’ l ‘5) = a(x*xf l l xi) 
if j # k or if 5; # x*. Furthermore, there is a number p such that 0~ p s 1 and such 
that for all p E Xkem’, 
3 Px*)({YlH = P and 6( px*)({y?}) = 1 - ,G. 
It then follows that 
That is, 
gd&= 
1 
c [PcY+(l -BM* (5.24) 
x ” pc C’ 
owever, because of (5.17), either [cl > cfi and c,Y C= c;1] or [c$ < cf and cz > cy]. 
From this ana (~23) and (5.24) we conclude that 
arkov- adequacy 
We now gather the results above in order to nish proving the theorems stated 
3.2 a 
3.3 and Theorem 5.4. Cl 
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